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The buildup of debt in the late 1990s has raised concerns about the U.S. nonfinancial
corporate sector’s health and its vulnerability to economic downturns. An analysis of the sector
suggests that while small firms are experiencing some weakness, corporations as a group
are in good financial shape.
U.S. corporate debt has grown rapidly in recent years.
Between 1995 and 1999, the outstanding debt of nonfi-
nancial corporations rose a hefty 46 percent—a trend
typified by last year’s increase of 12 percent. Viewed as a
share of GDP, such debt has now reached unprecedented
heights (Chart 1).
This seemingly high level of debt has concerned
some observers, who wonder whether it has made the
nonfinancial corporate sector financially weak and vul-
nerable to economic downturns. Such concerns have
gained credibility from the recent worsening of other
gauges of corporate health, notably default rates and
recovery rates on defaulted debt.
In this edition of Current Issues, we investigate
whether concerns over the buildup of U.S. corporate
debt are in fact justified. We examine the health of the
nonfinancial corporate sector on a firm-by-firm basis,
focusing chiefly on three key measures of health: lever-
age, liquidity, and overall solvency.1 Our analysis sug-
gests that the sector as a whole is in good shape, and
that its financial health has actually improved during
the late 1990s. Nonetheless, the health of small firms is
not as robust as that of large ones, and small firms are
continuing to experience a decline in health.
We also consider how the corporate sector might fare
in the face of an economic challenge such as a major
stock market correction or a large rise in interest rates.
We find that despite the sector’s current high level of
borrowing, leverage would remain manageable in the
wake of a large market correction. A significant rise in
interest rates, however, could push the sector’s liquidity
risk to the relatively high levels seen in the 1980s.
Corporate Indebtedness and Corporate Vulnerability
The rapid growth in corporate debt during the late
1990s raises questions about the financial health of the
sector and, indirectly, about the sensitivity of other sec-
tors to economic troubles.
Heavily indebted firms are particularly vulnerable
during economic downturns because their required debt
service cannot be scaled back easily. If demand for such
a firm’s products falls off steeply, the firm may be
forced to limit investments critical to its long-run via-
bility or to reduce staff beyond efficient levels. Not only
can these actions diminish the firm’s, and the country’s,
overall productivity, they can also perpetuate the eco-
nomic downturn as capital-goods orders drop and laid-
off employees curtail purchases. If the firm’s problems
persist, default or even bankruptcy could result, with
potentially large costs to creditors, employees, and
other stakeholders.
To clarify the relationship between corporate indebt-
edness and corporate vulnerability, we examine the
health of the nonfinancial corporate sector by using
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firm-level data—that is, we analyze it on a firm-by-
firm basis. We focus on three specific measures of cor-
porate health: leverage, liquidity, and overall solvency.
Leverage can be thought of as the ratio of a corpora-
tion’s debt to its long-run earnings capacity. Firms with
high debt levels relative to earnings capacity can be vul-
nerable to the economic troubles described above.
Liquidity refers to a company’s ability to meet its debt
service obligations; if interest rates are high, even those
firms with low debt relative to their long-run earnings
capacity could encounter difficulties servicing that debt.
Finally, overall firm solvency is a composite indicator of
corporate health that encompasses sales, earnings, and
capital as well as leverage and liquidity.
Leverage
There are many ways to calculate corporate leverage. As
our central measure, we use a firm’s long- plus short-
term debt as a share of its stock market value. To aggre-
gate individual firms’ leverage ratios into a sectorwide
average, we weight firms by their stock market values.
Computed in this way, average leverage for nonfinancial
firms declined fairly steadily—from 0.35 in late 1995 to
0.22 in September 1999—despite the concurrent rise in
overall debt. In essence, nonfinancial corporations in
September 1999 on average had debt liabilities with a
face value only slightly more than one-fifth the value of
their outstanding equity. Moreover, average corporate
leverage for the nonfinancial sector was rather low rela-
tive to the post-1974 average of 0.47 (Chart 2).2
Not only has borrowing by the nonfinancial corpo-
rate sector been moderate relative to equity growth, but
the borrowed funds seem to have been employed effi-
ciently. Capital expenditures of nonfinancial firms
began a period of extremely rapid growth in the mid-
1990s, roughly concurrent with the surge in debt.
Evidence that the investment has been productive can
be found in the fact that since 1995, output per hour at
nonfinancial firms has grown on average 2.6 percent
per year—a growth rate that easily exceeds the 1.9 per-
cent rate over 1975-95.
Of course, one could argue that these results are
unique to our particular measure of corporate leverage.
To explore that possibility, we also look at other lever-
age indicators.
Alternative Measures of Borrowing
A measure of borrowing narrower than ours, such as
long-term debt, may be useful if one is interested pri-
marily in leverage as an indicator of long-run solvency,
because firms typically associate long-term borrowing
with long-term growth prospects. Conversely, a broader
measure of borrowing, such as total liabilities, may be
useful if one’s interests extend beyond long-run sol-
vency, because many nondebt liabilities, such as
accounts payable, tend to grow during times of finan-
cial distress. Nevertheless, when we employ either
alternative measure of borrowing, we reach the same
conclusion as we did when we used our central measure
of leverage: on average, the leverage of U.S. nonfinan-
cial corporations was low and falling in the late 1990s.
Composition of Firms in the Sectorwide Average
Our central measure of leverage could be distorted by the
inclusion of high-tech firms in the sectorwide average.
Leverage for these firms tends to be quite low, and until
Chart 1
Debt of U.S. Nonfinancial Firms as a Share of GDP
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds 
Accounts.
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Chart 2
Average Leverage of U.S. Nonfinancial Firms
Weighted by Stock Market Value
Source: Compustat.
Notes: The chart depicts the ratio of the long-  plus short-term debt of nonfinancial
firms to the firms’ stock market value. For example, in the third quarter of 1999
(the most recent quarter plotted), firms on average had debt outstanding equal to
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Historical averagevery recently, the firms’ stock prices had risen particu-
larly rapidly. Thus, the improvement in average leverage
could have been driven primarily by the high-tech sector,
which we define to include biotech and communication
firms as well as firms directly engaged in the design
and construction of computer hardware and software.
As these firms’ weight in the overall average grows
each year, their low leverage could pull the sectorwide
average down further.
To evaluate this possibility, we excluded high-tech
firms from the average (once again, measuring borrow-
ing as short- plus long-term debt). The average leverage
ratio in 1999 then becomes 0.30, somewhat higher than
the level of 0.22 obtained when high-tech firms are
included. Nevertheless, even after high-tech firms are
excluded, leverage of the nonfinancial corporate sector
remains below its post-1974 average of 0.50 and shows
a decline since 1995.
Alternative Measures of Earnings Capacity
If the market value of equity is inflated by speculative
forces, then a firm’s stock market value may not be a
reliable measure of earnings capacity. Speculation-
induced overvaluation in the stock market could make
our measure of leverage unrealistically low and over-
state its decline in the late 1990s.
As an alternative to using stock market value to
determine earnings capacity, we can use the accounting
value of total assets. This measure is largely exempt from
overvaluation caused by speculative forces and thus could
prove especially useful in times of undue optimism in the
stock market. However, a firm’s reported asset value
reflects only historical investment costs; the value typi-
cally is unresponsive to either inflation or expectations of
future economic developments. When prices are rising,
the value of assets tends to be too low to provide a good
gauge of future earnings capacity, because that value
includes assets purchased years ago at prices below cur-
rent prices. Total asset value could also be too low relative
to true future earnings capacity if high stock market values
reflect genuinely favorable economic prospects rather
than undue optimism.
With these caveats in mind, we turn to a measure of
average corporate leverage that uses asset values to deter-
mine earnings capacity (Chart 3, top line). By this mea-
sure, the average leverage ratio declined modestly during
the late 1990s and—at 0.23 in September 1999—was still
slightly below its historical average of 0.25. Although this
measure has fallen less dramatically than our central mea-
sure and remains closer to its own historical average, it
nonetheless suggests that the leverage of the nonfinancial
corporate sector is not high.
Alternative Weighting Schemes
Our results could also be affected by the way in which
we aggregate individual firm leverage values into a sec-
torwide average. Thus, we substitute debt weights for
market values as weights in the aggregation—an
approach that could be useful if the object is to assess
the vulnerability of creditors to corporate distress.
When debt weights are used, firms with high market
value and low debt have less influence on the overall
average than they do when market value weights are
used. However, by using debt weights, we still obtain a
result similar to that derived from our central leverage
measure: average leverage remains below the post-1974
average (Chart 3, middle line).
We also use firms’ employment weights as an alter-
native to market values (Chart 3, bottom line). This
approach could be particularly helpful in evaluating the
vulnerability of aggregate employment to corporate dis-
tress. For example, consider the fact that some low-
leverage firms, such as Internet companies, have very
large market values but relatively few employees. These
firms would have a strong downward influence on an
average weighted by market value but a more muted
influence on one weighted by employment.
With regard to corporate health, an employment-
weighted measure yields the least optimistic result thus
far: average leverage actually rose in the late 1990s—
from 0.88 in December 1995 to 1.04 in December
1998—and was above the post-1974 average of 0.83.3
Nonetheless, leverage according to this measure is still




Average for U.S. Nonfinancial Firms
Source: Compustat.
Notes: The leverage measure represented by a dashed line is a moving average.
The following example illustrates how the leverage measures should be inter-
preted: in the third quarter of 1999 (the most recent quarter plotted), firms on
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The various leverage measures we have examined suggest
that the nonfinancial corporate sector as a whole is in
good shape. Do liquidity measures present a similarly
positive picture?
The recent growth in corporate debt reasonably gives
rise to concerns about heightened liquidity risk, defined
as the likelihood that a viable firm will be forced into
bankruptcy by a temporary inability to meet cash obli-
gations. Firms can minimize liquidity risk by maintain-
ing substantial liquid assets or plentiful cash flows.
Current liabilities, interest expense, liquid assets,
and cash flows are key components of a firm’s liquidity;
hence liquidity risk is often measured by ratios incorpo-
rating some of these elements. We focus on three com-
mon liquidity ratios: interest expense to current or readily
available assets, interest expense to cash flow, and current
liabilities to current assets.4 To aggregate individual
firm measures into an overall average, we again weight
firms by their stock market value.
Despite differences in the liquidity ratios, all three
confirm that the liquidity risk of the nonfinancial cor-
porate sector has not risen sharply during the late 1990s
(Chart 4). In addition, the ratios suggest that the sector’s
liquidity risk presently is not very high.
Overall Solvency
To measure solvency, economists typically compute a
summary measure of corporate health called a Z-score.
This score is a combination of five accounting ratios
that assess leverage, liquidity, sales, working capital,
and retained earnings. The first and most familiar Z-score
was published by Altman (1968). More recently, alterna-
tives have been offered by Begley, Ming, and Watts (1996)
and Shumway (1999). To calculate Z-scores, one multi-
plies each ratio by a number—for example (in the case of
Altman’s Z-score), 1.00 for the sales ratio, 3.30 for the
retained earnings ratio—and sums the resulting products.
Since Z-scores measure solvency, a higher score
indicates a lower risk of bankruptcy. Three Z-scores for
the U.S. nonfinancial corporate sector, computed using
the methods of the researchers cited above, show that
the likelihood of bankruptcy in this sector declined on
average in the late 1990s (Chart 5).
Firm Health: Size Matters
Some other measures of a firm’s financial health, such as
default rates and ratings changes, paint a less encouraging
picture of the corporate sector than the Z-scores and the
leverage and liquidity measures. From December 1995 to
September 1999, the number of speculative corporate
bond issuers in default rose from 3.2 to 5.2 percent, while
the average value recovered from defaulted debt fell from
45 to 32 percent of par value. Likewise, the ratio of
Standard and Poor’s corporate ratings downgrades to
upgrades doubled from 1.25 to 2.5.
To reconcile these divergent measures of corporate
health, we first note that default rates and ratings
changes give equal weight to all firms, while leverage,
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Chart 4
Average Liquidity of U.S. Nonfinancial Firms
Weighted by Stock Market Value
Source: Compustat.
Notes: The following example illustrates how the liquidity measures should be
interpreted: in the third quarter of 1999 (the most recent quarter plotted), firms
on average had current liabilities outstanding equal to approximately 79 percent


























Average Z-Scores of U.S. Nonfinancial Firms
Weighted by Stock Market Value
Source: Compustat.
Notes: The chart shows a rise in firms’ Z-scores (a measure of corporate
solvency) during the late 1990s, suggesting that the sector’s financial health
improved over the period. The increasing divergence of the three scores in
1996-99 primarily reflects their differing responses to stock market movements.
These movements enter through the leverage component of the Z-score.
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Shumway (1999)
Altman (1968)
BMW (1996)liquidity, and Z-scores give greater weight to larger
firms. This difference in the structure of the measures
invites us to look closely at the relationship between
firm size and firm health. A deterioration in small
firms’financial health during the late 1990s might have
shown up in sectorwide measures such as default rates,
which give small and large firms equal weight, even
though that deterioration was not noticeable in such
measures as leverage, which assigns firms a weight
commensurate with their size.
As we see from Chart 6, the financial health of small
firms did indeed worsen during the late 1990s.
Leverage ratios for the smallest 20 percent of firms
(ranked by market value) rose sharply after 1995 and
are now fairly high by historical standards. Liquidity
measures confirm that the decline in health is concen-
trated in the smallest firms, as do solvency measures
such as Altman’s Z-score. This sizable deterioration can
explain why measures such as default rates rose in the
late 1990s, even as overall leverage declined.
Small firms’ financial weakness certainly merits
monitoring as we go forward, especially since these
firms contribute disproportionately to the creation of
new jobs. Nevertheless, the smallest 20 percent of these
firms account for only about 
1/10 of 1 percent of total
market value, ½ of 1 percent of all debt, and 1 percent of
all employment. Therefore, any difficulties experienced
by small firms will likely have limited near-term effects
on aggregate macroeconomic activity.5
Vulnerability to Financial Shocks
As a final check, we consider how a steep plunge in the
stock market or a sharp rise in interest rates might affect
the health of the nonfinancial corporate sector.
A Major Market Correction
Suppose that the stock market declined dramatically from
its level in late 1999, when our most recent figures were
compiled. How would corporate leverage be affected? We
begin by assuming that prices return to late 1995 values;
this benchmark offers the advantage of imposing the
largest price declines on the firms that experienced the
most dramatic price rises during the late 1990s. The aver-
age stock price decline implied by this scenario, relative
to September 1999, is a sizable 57 percent.
Our findings suggest that corporate leverage would
remain manageable in the event of a major market cor-
rection. In our scenario, the face value of outstanding
debt as a share of outstanding equity at nonfinancial
corporations would rise to an average of 0.42. Although
well above the late 1999 value of 0.22, the value would
still be below the historical average of 0.47, despite the
magnitude of the price declines. Note, too, that the firms
whose share prices would likely tumble the most—that is,
high-tech firms—tend to have low leverage.
Corporate solvency, too, would remain comfortably
above its historical average after a major stock market
correction. As measured by Altman’s Z-score, solvency
at 1995 prices would be 7.2—a value below September
1999’s value of 9.7 but still more than double the historical
average of 3.3.
A Large Rise in Interest Rates
If interest rates were to increase sharply, how would
corporate liquidity fare, say, after one year? First, we
assume that interest rates rise by the same amount that
they rose, on average, during the four quarters before
each of the previous four recessions. Increases of
roughly 400 basis points in the prime rate and 200 basis
points in the Baa bond yield would result.
Next, we consider how these interest rate increases
would affect total interest expense, since this measure
would be directly affected by an elevation in rates. To pro-
vide an accurate estimate of the change in interest
expense, we need to know how much of the outstanding
corporate debt would “reprice,” or bear a higher interest
rate, after a year. Fortunately, this information is available.
We also need to know the amount by which interest on
that debt would rise. Unfortunately, this information is
unavailable. Finally, it would help to know the extent to
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Chart 6
U.S. Nonfinancial Firms’ Average Ratio of Total Debt 
to Stock Market Value, by Firm Size
Weighted by Stock Market Value
Source: Compustat.
Notes: The chart illustrates the decline in small firms’ health in the late 1990s.
For example, in the third quarter of 1999 (the most recent quarter plotted), the
smallest 20 percent of firms on average had total debt outstanding equal to
roughly 2.00 times the amount of their total assets, compared with the historical
average of 1.27. The gray lines represent the post-1975 averages for the five size
percentiles. The top gray line refers to the smallest 20 percent; the gray line
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which each firm has hedged its exposure to interest rate
changes. Again, this information is unavailable.
To compensate for these data limitations, we con-
struct two estimates of the effect of a rise in interest
rates on total interest expense: one that should exceed
the actual outcome and one that should fall short of it.
In particular, we assume that the debt exposed to inter-
est rate changes in one year all reprices at the prime
rate; next, we assume that this debt all reprices at the
long-term bond yield. Our first assumption almost cer-
tainly overstates the true increase in interest expense,
our second surely understates it.
This procedure reveals that after a large interest rate
rise, the liquidity risk of the nonfinancial corporate sec-
tor—measured by the ratio of interest expense to current
assets—would lie between 0.176 and 0.193.6 This ratio
is higher than the post-1974 average of 0.167, suggest-
ing potential liquidity problems for the sector. Even
more noteworthy is the possibility that the ratio would
approach the 1980s average of 0.190; corporate liquidity
during this decade was a source of widespread concern.
Conclusion
Despite rapid debt growth in recent years, the nonfinan-
cial corporate sector is in good financial health. Some
weakness, however, exists among the sector’s smallest
firms. The sector as a whole would likely withstand a
major stock market correction without a huge disrup-
tion, but a large rise in interest rates could bring the sec-
tor’s liquidity risk back to the relatively high levels
common in the 1980s.
Notes
1. In this article, we examine only nonfinancial firms. Financial
firms, by their nature, borrow heavily, so their leverage is generally
extremely high. By excluding financial firms from our analysis, we
avoid distortionary comparisons. In addition, except where noted,
1999 data were available only through the third quarter.
2. Corporate finance theory currently cannot prescribe a “correct”
level of borrowing for individual firms, and thus it cannot define an
absolute level of leverage that would be safe or appropriate for the
economy as a whole. For this reason, we examine leverage relative
to its own historical values.
3. December 1995 to December 1998 is the most recent period for
which we have reasonably comprehensive employment data.
However, these data are not universally available in the Compustat
database (our source), so a measure based on employment weights
must be interpreted with care.
4. Current liabilities are primarily notes payable, debt due in one
year, accounts payable, income taxes payable, and accrued
expenses. Current assets are mainly cash and short-term deposits,
accounts receivable, inventories, and prepaid expenses. Interest
expense is reported in the aggregate for each firm. Cash flow is
operating income before depreciation. By excluding capital expen-
ditures from our measure of cash flow, we do not change our overall
conclusions.
5. Further examination of the firm-by-firm data suggests that there
are no noticeable patterns of change across industries aside from
those related to size.
6. Our assessment of the impact of an interest rate rise makes no
allowance for likely negative effects on business activity, so the
actual increase in liquidity risk would likely be even higher than
these figures suggest.
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